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ABSTRACT
This article will explore the oft-overlooked area of police powers granted to
local municipalities by the California Constitution through the lens of marijuana
dispensaries. These dispensaries, and the obstacles they face, provide the perfect
vantage point from which to survey the current status of zoning power in
California. This article will consider the extent and limits of what is known as the
“police powers” of local municipalities: the power of cities, towns and counties to
regulate, restrict, and proscribe the way in which land can be utilized within its
borders. If local municipalities are the creation of the state—indeed, an extension
of the state government’s power, subject to its whims—then can a city, town, or
county simply defy the expressed will of the state legislature? Or, in a parallel real
example, how can a fast-food restaurant hoping to open a new location in Los
Angeles be banned outright from an entire community, even though such
restaurants are sanctioned by the legislature in Sacramento?
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I. INTRODUCTION
“I’ve often thought that if our zoning boards could be put in charge of botanists, of
zoologists and geologists, and people who know about the earth, we would have
much more wisdom in such planning than we have when we leave it to the
engineers . . . .”
-Justice William Orville Douglas
If local municipalities are a creation of the state—indeed, an extension of the
state government’s power, subject to its whims—then can a city, town, or county
simply defy the expressed will of the state legislature? 1 Can a city planning
commission, acting within the confines of the power granted to it by the state, flout
state law in order to effectuate their own ends? Or in real terms, how can a fastfood restaurant hoping to open up a new location in Los Angeles be banned
outright from an entire community, even though such restaurants are sanctioned by
the legislature in Sacramento? 2
This article is designed to explore the oft-overlooked area of police powers
granted to local municipalities by the California Constitution. The power of cities,
towns, and counties to regulate, restrict, and proscribe the way in which land can
be utilized within its borders is often taken for granted by those with the authority
to do so. Zoning rules and regulations are so common place that they are easily
ignored. 3
On occasion, however, a request for a business permit crosses the desk of a
local city planner that drags the zoning process to a standstill. 4 Although it is
counter-intuitive, just because a business is legal under state or federal law, does
not mean that it can simply open anywhere; in some cases a business can be

* Pepperdine University School of Law, Juris Doctor candidate, 2012; BA Northeastern University.
1
This premise was established in California shortly after the state’s admission to the Union in
1850. See Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 92 (Cal. 1913) (quoting Payne v. Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220,
233 (1860)) (“A municipal corporation is a public institution, created for public purposes; the
municipality is a political subdivision or department of the state, governed, and regulated, and
constituted by public law . . . the original power to control, as well as to create them, therefore, is in the
Legislature.”); see also San Francisco v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 557 (1872) (“[M]unicipal corporations
are but subordinate subdivisions of the State Government, which may be created, altered, or abolished,
at the will of the legislature . . . .”).
2
Jennifer Medina, In South Los Angeles, New Fast-Food Spots Get a ‘No, Thanks.’ N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/16/us/16fastfood.html.
3
Consider all the aspects of a town or city that zoning affects: where schools can be located, what
businesses are allowed to open and where. Homes are not often found in the middle of an industrial
complex, and the reasoning for that is zoning.
4
When faced with an increase in unwanted zoning applications, some cities have held special
meetings in order to create moratoriums. See City of Corona v. Naulls, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 4 (Ct. App.
2008) (noting that following Naulls’ application to open a marijuana dispensary, the city of Corona held
an emergency “special meeting” in order to create a moratorium on all future dispensaries). In some
unfortunate situations, cities have spent years grappling with how to handle a new business. For an
example look to the fast-food debate taking place in South Los Angeles for over two years: following a
one year moratorium passed in 2008, the Los Angeles City Council extended the moratorium twice,
while it debated the merits of an outright fast-food ban. See supra note 2. The moratorium was made
permanent, and now, no new fast-food restaurants are allowed to open. Id.
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banned outright from an entire jurisdiction. 5 When this happens, litigation is
almost certain to ensue and the question of whether or not a local municipality
possesses the constitutional authority to ban said business—or in some extremes to
criminalize it—once again rises from legal obscurity.
This paper will consider the extent and limits of what is known as the “police
powers” of local municipalities through the lens of the state-sanctioned marijuana
dispensaries that have recently exploded into existence across the state. 6 These
dispensaries, though legal under state law, have been criminalized or banned
permanently or temporarily in multiple jurisdictions throughout California,
prompting a string of lawsuits that have left the state with a patchwork of legal
guidelines.
This is not a narrow question addressing only dispensaries. The issues
surrounding local police powers affects any entrepreneur hoping to start a business
in any given location, or in fact, any business already in existence. Single
individuals hoping to start a closely-held corporation are subject to the same
zoning powers as publicly-traded mega companies. 7 These dispensaries, however,
and the obstacles they face, provide the perfect vantage point from which to survey
the current status of zoning power in California.
Part II of this article will provide the legal framework within which zoning
authority exists, considering where local municipalities derive their power, the
evolution of zoning law, and the deference the courts pay to the local authorities.
Part III of this article will expand to consider the limits of zoning authority, the
most important of which, for this analysis, is the preemption of state law. If
California law says that “big-box retailers” like Wal-Mart or timber mills operating
within statutory limits are legal, how can a city ban them? Can a city criminalize
them? Part IV will provide a very brief history of the legalization of medicinal
marijuana in California and the current legal battles being fought over a
dispensary’s right to exist in the face of local ordinances banning or criminalizing
them. Part V will analyze how zoning laws and the doctrine of preemption affects
businesses of all types. Part VI will apply the analysis to the real world. Finally,
this article will conclude by suggesting that the doctrine of preemption has been
applied too weakly, and the current litigation over marijuana dispensaries provides
the ideal opportunity for the courts to give the doctrine enough bite to protect legal
businesses from the political whims of local governance.

5
See generally Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420 (Ct. App. 2006)
(finding that a zoning regulation banning all “big box” retailers from the city was within the police
powers of the jurisdiction).
6
“Before a 2007 moratorium, the city of Los Angeles had issued 186 medical marijuana
dispensary licenses. Since the moratorium, nearly 800 applications for hardship exemptions have been
filed.” Where’s The Weed? L.A. TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-dispensariesi,0,5658093.htmlstory (last visited Feb. 10, 2012).
7
Compare Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421(dealing with a claim brought by publiclytraded Wal-Mart), with City of Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2009) (dealing with a
claim brought against an individual hoping to start his own business).
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II. LOCAL POLICE POWERS
“Our community is like many around the country that have . . . sophisticated
planning and zoning regulations. These are elements that are developed as a
result of local community pressure to balance interests.”
-United States Representative Earl Blumenauer
A. Zoning Ordinances
“Zoning is the deprivation, for the public good, of certain uses by owners of
property to which their property might otherwise be put . . . .” 8 In its purest form,
zoning ordinances manifest themselves as the division of a municipality into
districts, with each district having a unique set of regulations. 9 These regulations
most commonly foist restrictions upon property owners regarding the extent to
which their property may be used, and more often than not, concern the type of
structures that can be built and the types of businesses that can operate out of
them. 10
The overarching theory behind zoning power is that property-owners—or
more specifically, the land that they own—may be regulated for the good of the
community as a whole. 11 These regulations are most often created by a city
planning agency or other governmental body in order to create a “general plan” for
the city as required under California law. 12 Although zoning decisions affect
specified, individual neighborhoods, and the property owners within them, they are
firmly legislative decisions as they ultimately affect the community at large. 13
These decisions require the analysis of aesthetic, environmental, and economic

8

Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 60 P.2d 847, 850 (Cal. 1936).
See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1009 (Cal. 1976); see also Consol. Rock
Prods. Co. v. City of L.A., 370 P.2d 342, 345–46 (Cal. 1962).
10
See Birkenfeld, 550 P.2d at 1009; see also Consol. Rock Prods. Co., 370 P.2d at 345–46.
11
Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of L.A., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536–40 (Ct. App.
1994) (referencing Floresta, Inc. v. City Council, 12 Cal. Rptr. 182 (Ct. App. 1961)). In Floresta,
Justice Tobriner provides a succinct overview of zoning power and its origins:
The concept of zoning reaches back historically to the Renaissance plans of
public planning that started in Italy and spread to France; it is symbolized by the
famous plan of Sir Christopher Wren for London after the fire of 1666 and in the
United States by the L’Enfant’s planned cities of Washington and Indianapolis;
indeed, before its first significant development in the city planning of New York
in this country, such planning had been widely accepted in Sweden and
Germany. As is stated in Recent Social Trends in the U.S. by the Research
Committee on Social Trends (1934, McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc.), “The zoning
movement . . . began over 30 years ago and today every state and the District of
Columbia has adopted some form of zoning legislation or regulation. Since 1916
when New York City adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance, the decided
trend has been to integrate zoning with city planning. Today all but two states
have comprehensive zoning legislation.”
Floresta, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
12
CAL GOV’T. CODE § 65350 (West 2011).
13
Metro. Baptist Church v. D.C. Dep’t. of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs—Historic Pres.
Review Bd., 718 A.2d 119 (D.C. 1998).
9
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considerations. 14
The initial impetuous of zoning laws in California comes from article XI,
section 7 of the state Constitution, which states in its entirety: “A county or city
may make and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other
ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general laws.” 15 Subsequent
government codes have further identified the powers of local authorities to adopt
ordinances in furtherance of the above-enumerated powers in order to promote the
general welfare of society. 16 This authority has come to be known as the “police
powers,” at the state and local level. 17 Zoning ordinances, therefore, subject to a
few exceptions discussed infra, embody a constitutionally legitimate exercise of a
municipality’s police power. 18
The California Government Code not only provides specified authority for
local municipalities to regulate the use of their land, but also provides the general
framework for the creation and execution of zoning ordinances. 19 This framework
involves a variety of topics from notice requirements to standards delineating the
applicability of zoning powers. 20 It is analytically important to note that local
zoning boards and municipalities do not have an inherent authority to regulate the
usage of land. 21 This authority is delegated to the cities and counties from the state
legislature—which follows, given that cities and counties are the creation of the
state. 22
Despite a seemingly broad grant of power to the towns and cities, subsequent
decisions have limited the scope of the police powers. These limits are based on
common law interpretations of article XI, section 7 of the state Constitution and
the California Government Code. 23 The court’s understanding of what constitutes
a legitimate use of police power has evolved little over time, but centers on the
idea that a zoning ordinance is valid if it has a “real or substantial relationship to
the public health, safety, morals or general welfare” of the municipality. 24 This
understanding of the law was first applied in 1925 by the California Supreme

14

Id.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
16
CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65000 et seq. (West 2011), also known as The Planning and Zoning Law
section of the Government Code. More specifically, § 65850 states in relevant part: “The legislative
body of any county or city may, pursuant to this chapter, adopt ordinances that do any of the following:
(a) regulate the use of buildings, structures, and land as between industry, business, residences, open
spaces . . . .” Id. at § 65850.
17
The term “police power” is commonly used to describe the inherent governmental power to
enact laws that promote the general welfare of society—within constitutional limits. In its purest form,
it is the power to govern. See generally Graham v. Kingwell, 24 P.2d 488, 489 (Cal. 1933).
18
Lockard v. City of L.A., 202 P.2d 38 (Cal. 1949).
19
CAL. GOV’T. CODE §§ 65000 et seq. (West 2011).
20
Id.
21
See id. ; see also CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
22
See supra note 1; see also Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89,
103 (2010). As the saying goes, or at least should go—the legislature giveth, and the legislature taketh
away.
23
Supra note 1; CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7.
24
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 439 (Ct. App. 2006) (quoting
Assoc’d. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1976)).
15
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Court, 25 but was adopted shortly after by the United States Supreme Court. 26
Courts maintain severe deference to the local legislatures when determining the
constitutionality of an ordinance; even going so far as to presume
constitutionality. 27
In California, courts have adhered to a path that is so deferential that if there
is a possibility that reasonable minds could differ on the propriety of an ordinance,
there will be no judicial interference. 28 Nevertheless, a land use ordinance will be
held invalid if it is found to be arbitrary or unreasonable, possessing no real
relationship to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare of the
community. 29 Moreover, a zoning ordinance is only entitled to regulate economic
competition when its aim is to advance a legitimate public purpose. 30
It is also important to consider the area that may be affected by a zoning
ordinance. 31 If the ordinance will affect not just those in a given jurisdiction, but
perhaps an entire region comprised of multiple jurisdictions, then the court must
consider the welfare of that entire region. 32
B. Nuisance Laws
A “nuisance” is defined as “[a]nything injurious to health . . . or is indecent
or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property so as to
interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . .” 33 However,
“[n]othing which is done or maintained under the express authority of a statute can
be deemed a nuisance.” 34 There are two overarching types of nuisances: those that
are public and those that are private. For the purposes of this analysis, the most
relevant is that of a public nuisance, namely, “one which affects at the same time
an entire community or neighborhood, or any considerable number of
persons . . . .” 35 Nuisance laws and zoning regulations often overlap, making it
necessary to discuss them at least to the extent required to understand how they

25

See Miller v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 234 P. 381 (Cal. 1925).
See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
27
Lockard v. City of L.A., 202 P.2d 38, 38 (Cal. 1949).
28
Clemons v. City of L.A., 222 P.2d 439 (Cal. 1950). Again, the United States Supreme Court has
promulgated a nearly identical test: “If the validity . . . [is] fairly debatable, the legislative judgment
must be allowed to control.” Euclid, 272 U.S. at 388.
29
Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 473. It is a rare day when a court overturns a local ordinance on the
grounds that it is unreasonable or arbitrary. See Desert Turf Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882
(Cal. Ct. App. 1956) (finding an ordinance banning horse racing in San Bernardino County to be
arbitrary).
30
Hernandez v. City of Hartford, 159 P.3d 33, 40–46 (2007). This is a particularly fragile and
contentious issue, which could be the subject of an entire article—but for our purposes, the rule as laid
out by the court in Hernandez is sufficient.
31
Home Builders, 557 P.2d at 487.
32
Id. Stating, “the proper constitutional test [of the validity of an ordinance] is one which inquires
whether the ordinance reasonably relates to those whom it significantly affects.” Id.
33
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2011).
34
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3482 (West 2011).
35
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3480 (West 2011).
26
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affect budding businesses targeted by zoning boards. 36
Simply put, there is an immediate relationship between zoning laws and
prohibiting nuisances. 37 However, they are not mutually dependent: the existence
of a nuisance is no longer necessary for the operation of a zoning ordinance. 38 If,
however, an activity, object, or circumstance is declared to be a nuisance by statute
or zoning ordinance, then the very existence of that activity, object, or
circumstance makes it a “nuisance per se,” and thus subject to the applicable
nuisance laws. 39 This information will prove itself relevant when taking a look at
the steps zoning boards, and in fact the courts themselves, have taken to block the
establishment of certain businesses within their jurisdictions.
C. Moratoriums
In the event that the zoning board deems it necessary, an interim ordinance
may be adopted in order to temporarily halt the creation of new businesses or
structures. 40 This is considered an emergency measure that is also known as a
moratorium. 41 A moratorium creates a temporary ban on the issuance of a certain
type of permit while the zoning board determines what steps it will take to regulate
the requested construction or business. 42 Generally speaking, a moratorium is used
when a novel type of business or construction—not foreseen in the city’s “general
plan”—arrives in the jurisdiction. 43
The ability of a zoning board to implement a moratorium is not universal
however, and is subject to its own set of limitations. 44 Most importantly, an
interim ordinance is only a temporary solution. The moratorium is statutorily
limited to forty-five days, with the option to extend it two more times, up to two
years. 45 The moratorium is used to “protect the public safety, health, and welfare”
by “prohibiting any uses [of land] that may be in conflict with a contemplated
general plan” while the legislative body studies the topic. 46 Again, courts have
taken a very deferential approach to challenged moratoriums. 47

36

A comprehensive overview of nuisance laws would be too expansive for this article.
See generally Mid-West Emery Freight Sys. v. City of Chi., 257 N.E.2d 127 (Ill. 1970) (holding
plaintiff failed to overcome the zoning ordinance’s presumption of validity).
38
Beverly Oil Co. v. City of L.A., 254 P.2d 865, 554 (Cal. 1953). “However, the existence of a
nuisance is not necessarily the basis on which a zoning ordinance may operate against a particular
industry.” Id.
39
Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 10 (Ct. App. 2009).
40
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858 (West 2002).
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
See generally Martin v. Superior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 513 (Ct. App. 1991) (a moratorium
freezing construction on a hillside property was found to exceed the bounds of § 65858).
44
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858(b) (West 2002).
45
Id.
46
CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65858(a) (West 2002).
47
See generally Assoc’d. Home Builders v. City of Livermore, 557 P.2d 473, 486 (Cal. 1976)
(stating that a challenged zoning decision is presumed to be legitimate); see also Lockard v. City of
L.A., 202 P.2d 38, 42 (Cal. 1949) (stating that “every intendment is in favor of the validity of such an
ordinances”).
37
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III. THE DOCTRINE OF PREEMPTION
“What can a provincial legislature do when [central government] possess the
exclusive regulation of external and internal commerce?”
-Anonymous Author of Anti-Federalist Number 9
As expressed in part II, article XI, section 7 of the California State
Constitution, the Government Code and the common law all give local authorities
an often-surprising amount of leeway in matters of local concern. 48 The power,
however, is not unlimited. 49 As previously discussed, any ordinance must be
reasonable and rational. 50 Yet, that is not the end of an ordinance’s limitations.
Arguably the most powerful form of protection a business owner has against a
zoning regulation comes from the doctrine of preemption. Although the zoning
board is given a wide berth in the regulation of local matters, the power is curbed
by the concept of state sovereignty, which could limit the applicability of
ordinances in conflict with state law. 51
The over-simplified definition of the doctrine of preemption is that “local
legislation in conflict with general law is void.” 52 This derives directly from the
very text of article XI, section 7, which again reads: “A county or city may make
and enforce within its limits all local, police, sanitary and other ordinances and
regulations not in conflict with general laws.” 53 Nevertheless, this does not truly
engage the whole picture. In fact, a conflict arises if the local ordinance
“duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law.” 54
Because traditionally local governments have always maintained control
over land-use regulations, the courts will presume that the regulation is not
preempted by the state legislature. 55 The only possibility of overcoming this
presumption is by showing a clear indication of preemptive intent made by the
state, or in the alternative, by showing that the legislated material regards only a
municipal affair. 56

48

See supra notes 21–28 and accompanying text.
Id.
50
See supra note 28.
51
Korean Am. Legal Advocacy Found. v. City of L.A., 28 Cal. Rptr. 2d 530, 536 (Ct. App. 1994).
52
Deukmejian v. County of Mendocino, 683 P.2d 1150, 1155 (Cal. 1984).
53
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (emphasis added).
54
Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993).
55
Compare O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 162 P.3d 583 (Cal. 2007) (ordinance requiring the
seizing of a vehicle used in the solicitation of prostitution was preempted by state law), with Big Creek
Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821 (Cal. 2006) (ordinance limiting locations of timber
operations not preempted by state law).
56
Compare Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (determining
whether or not the state legislature indicated preemptive intent), with Yost v. Thomas, 685 P.2d 1152
(Cal. 1984) (stating it is “undisputed that in matters of general statewide concern the state may preempt
local regulation”).
49
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A. Express Preemption vs. Implied Preemption
In determining whether or not state law preempts an ordinance, the courts
apply a three-pronged test. 57 First, the court must determine whether or not the
ordinance duplicates, contradicts, or enters an area fully occupied by general law. 58
Assuming it does, the court then considers whether the ordinance addresses a
municipal issue or a statewide concern. 59 In the event that the ordinance addresses
a statewide matter, then the court must next consider whether or not the state
legislature expressly or implicitly indicated preemptive intent in enacting the
statute with which it conflicts. 60 Alternatively, if the question addressed by the
ordinance is found to be one of local concern, then the court, bound by article XI,
section 5 of the California State Constitution, will find the ordinance supersedes
state law. 61
Determining if the local ordinance is in conflict with state law is the first
step. 62 Duplication of state law occurs when an ordinance is “coextensive,” or
purports to impose the same prohibition that the general law imposes. 63 Next, an
ordinance contradicts state law when it cannot be reconciled with state law. 64
Finally, a local ordinance can come into conflict with state law when it enters a
field fully occupied by state law either through the expressed intent of the
legislature to fully occupy the legal area, or through implicit intent. 65 Broken
down, a local ordinance is in conflict with the general laws when it duplicates, is
irreconcilable with, or enters a field fully occupied by, state law. 66
In the event that a conflict is found to exist, article XI, section 5 of the state
constitution vests local municipalities with the authority to supersede all other
inconsistent laws respecting municipal affairs. 67 Put differently, if the matter in
question is merely a local issue—and not one of statewide concern—then the local

57

See O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 586–88; see also Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 820–21.
O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587.
59
Supra notes 52–52 and accompanying text.
60
Id.
61
Id. Article XI, section 5(a) states:
It shall be competent in any city charter to provide that the city governed
thereunder may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect to
municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations provided in their
several charters and in respect to other matters they shall be subject to general
laws. City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any
existing charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all laws
inconsistent therewith.
Id. (emphasis added).
62
O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587
63
Id. (quoting Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of L.A., 844 P.2d 534, 536 (Cal. 1993)).
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Duplication of state law is the easiest to identify, as it is essentially self-explanatory. If a local
ordinance prohibits or requires what state law already prohibits or requires, then it is duplicative.
Irreconcilable is the opposite of duplication: namely, that a local ordinance cannot require an action
which state law prohibits, or visa-versa. Finally, and most complex, a local ordinance cannot enter a
field fully occupied by state law. See id. This last factor is explored infra.
67
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5.
58
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ordinance concerning such a question controls, even over state law. 68 This has
come to be known as the “Home Rule.” 69 The court’s interpretation of this rule
has changed drastically over time. 70 Although the original understanding of a
“municipal affair” was expansive, the California Supreme Court has slowly
chipped away at what a local legislature can call sovereign legal territory. 71 This
has not occurred without dissent among the courts. 72
Having determined that the ordinance touches upon issues of statewide
concern, and is not simply addressing a municipal affair, the court will then move
on to the third part of the preemption test: whether the state legislature had
intended for the statute to preempt local ordinances. 73 The courts recognize both
expressed and implicit intent. 74 Expressed intent is the most efficient method for
any party hoping to prove that a local ordinance is invalid under the doctrine of
preemption. 75 The most common form of expressed intent is a direct contradiction
between the local ordinance and the statute because it is clear that if the state
legislature said something that specifically conflicts with the ordinance, then it
expressly dominates that point of law. 76 Consider the ruling in Piploy v. Benson,
where the court suggested that “[w]here a statute and an ordinance are identical it
is obvious that the field sought to be covered by the ordinance has already been
occupied by state legislation.” 77
Nevertheless, expressed intent is difficult to establish given the state
legislature’s “intention to provide only a minimum of limitation in order that
counties and cities may exercise the maximum degree of control over local zoning

68

See Johnson v. Bradley, 841 P.2d 990, 994 (Cal. 1992).
Id. at 993–95.
70
For a more detailed analysis of this evolution, Chief Justice Lucas provides a brief overview of
the history of the Home Rule in California in Johnson. Id. at 993–95. Although the courts had found
that the legislature intended to vest local government with police power over local affairs at the outset
of the California Constitution, the only way to guarantee that power was through an amendment to the
constitution. Id. As a result, from 1896 to 1968, multiple amendments were made to the Constitution
in an effort to clarify and solidify the Home Rule, resulting in article XI, section 5. Id. at 994–95.
71
Compare Bishop v. City of San Jose, 460 P.2d 137, 144 (Cal. 1969) (“The fact, standing alone,
that the Legislature has attempted to deal with a particular subject on a statewide basis is not
determinative of the issue as between state and municipal affairs.”), with O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 587
(finding that although a matter may be a municipal concern, state Legislature involvement in the matter
makes it a statewide concern). Further, the court has said, “[t]he common thread of the cases is that if
there is a significant local interest to be served which may differ from one locality to another then the
presumption favors the validity of the local ordinance against an attack of state preemption.” Gluck v.
County of L.A., 155 Cal. Rptr. 435, 441 (Ct. App. 1979).
72
See O’Connell, 162 P.3d at 593–96 (Corrigan, J., dissenting).
73
Id. at 587–88. An analogous test is well founded in federal law: “When Congress legislates in a
field traditionally occupied by the States, ‘we start with the assumption that the historic police powers
of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress.’” Bronco Wine Co. v. Jolly, 95 P.3d 422, 429 (Cal. 2004) (quoting California v.
ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)).
74
See Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 828–33 (Cal. 2006)
(analyzing both expressed and implicit intent).
75
See generally id.
76
Contradiction, as discussed above, occurs when an ordinance cannot be reconciled with state
law. Supra note 61.
77
Piploy v. Benson, 125 P.2d 482, 485 (Cal. 1942).
69
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matters.” 78 It is therefore rare, but not unheard of, for civil legislation to specify
its intention to dominate the legal landscape. 79
Otherwise, the courts can look to the implied intent of the legislature. 80
There are three indicia of the intent to fully occupy the area of law that the courts
have consistently recognized. 81 First, “the subject matter has been so fully and
completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate that it has become
exclusively a matter of state concern.” 82 Second, “the subject matter has been
partially covered by general law couched in such terms as to indicate clearly that a
paramount state concern will not tolerate future or additional legal action.” 83
Finally, “the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the
subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefits to the locality.” 84
In determining implied preemption, the court is not to look merely at the
words, but at the totality of circumstances surrounding the statute. 85 This includes,
but is not limited to, the history behind the law in conjunction with its language
and scope, as well as the history behind that form of regulation. 86
In O’Connell, the court recognized a split among the appellate districts in
determining what does and does not constitute a municipal affair. 87 There, an
ordinance was passed in Stockton, which provided for the forfeiture of “any
vehicle used to solicit an act of prostitution, or to acquire or attempt to acquire any
controlled substance” in the city. 88 O’Connell challenged the law, seeking an
injunction, claiming, in part, that the law was preempted by state laws governing
vehicle forfeitures. 89 The court agreed. 90 Applying the three-pronged analysis, the
78

CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 65800 (West 2008).
See Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. City of L.A., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 38, 43–45 (Ct. App. 2009) (finding
that by including the phrase “it is the intent of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of health and
sanitation standards for retail food facilities” the legislature created an expressed intent to fully occupy
the field). See also Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 827–32. It is much more common in criminal law to
find a contradiction (and therefore expressed intent), given that any local ordinance that seeks to
establish a punishment inimical to one prescribed by state law will be found to be conflict with it.
Compare In re Portnoy, 131 P.2d 1, 3 (Cal. 1942) (local legislation imposed the same criminal
prohibition as the general law—therefore conflicts), with Ex Parte Daniels, 192 P. 442 (Cal. 1920)
(finding a contradiction in laws when a local ordinance set the speed limit below that set by the state).
80
Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 832.
81
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 820 (Cal. 2005).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id. “The denial of power to a local body when the state has preempted the field is not based
solely upon the superior authority of the state. It is a rule of necessity, based upon the need to prevent
dual regulations that could result in uncertainty and confusion.” Abbott v. City of L.A. 349 P.2d 974,
979 (Cal. 1960).
85
Am. Fin. Servs., 104 P.3d at 820–21
86
Id. “Where the legislature has adopted statutes governing a particular subject matter, its intent
with regard to occupying the field to the exclusion of all local regulation is not to be measured alone by
the language used but by the whole purpose and scope of the legislative scheme.” Tolman v. Underhill,
249 P.2d 280, 283 (Cal. 1952).
87
O’Connell v. City of Stockton, 162 P.3d 583, 586 (Cal. 2007).
88
Id. at 588.
89
Id. at 585.
90
Id. at 593.
79
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court determined that the state had addressed questions of vehicular forfeiture
through multiple provisions of the state’s Penal and Vehicle Codes, “leaving no
room for further regulation at the local level.” 91 This meant that (1) the ordinance
was in conflict with general law because it had entered a field fully occupied by
the state; (2) the law was made a statewide concern via the state legislature’s
involvement; and (3) that the legislature had implicitly preempted local ordinances
concerning the same topic. 92
Analogously, in American Financial Services, the court was asked to
determine if an Oakland ordinance regulating predatory lending practices in the
local home mortgage market was preempted by a state law enacted to achieve the
same thing. 93 The court applied the same three-pronged analysis: determining first
and foremost that the ordinance was in conflict with general law by entering an
area occupied by the state. 94 Next, the court questioned whether or not predatory
lending practices were a statewide concern or a municipal affair. The court found
that the “regulation of predatory practices in mortgage lending is one of statewide
concern.” 95 Therefore, the court examined the circumstances surrounding the
statute, as well as the language of the statute itself to determine if the legislature
had intended for the statute to preempt local ordinances. 96 In doing so, the court
found that the state law was comprehensive and detailed in its scope, and that
historically, the area of regulating home mortgages was dominated by the state. 97
These factors led the court to the conclusion that the California legislature had
intended for the state law to supersede local ordinances. 98
B. The Right to Abate Nuisance
Local municipalities maintain the authority to abate nuisances, and can do so
through its police powers. 99 As a result, no business has a vested right to conduct
itself in a manner that the city constitutes a nuisance. 100 Like every other power
discussed thus far, the ability to regulate, as a nuisance, any activity or business is
limited: zoning regulations cannot prohibit what the state has expressly
authorized. 101 This, again, is an over simplification. A board of supervisors may
exclude, on certain grounds, a business from parts of their jurisdiction, or even
from the entire jurisdiction given the right circumstances. 102 However, the “certain

91

Id. at 592.
Id.
93
Am. Fin. Servs. Ass’n. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813, 815 (Cal. 2005).
94
Id. at 820–23.
95
Id. at 820.
96
Id. at 820–23.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 823.
99
City of Oakland v. Superior Court, 53 Cal. Rptr. 2d 120, 131 (Ct. App. 1996).
100
Id.
101
See Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
102
Compare Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 886 (finding the outright ban of horse racing tracks an
overextension of zoning powers), with Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420,
421–22 (Ct. App. 2006) (finding an outright ban of “big-box retailers” constitutionally acceptable).
92
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grounds” requirement is a reference to the necessity that the outright ban be based
on some reasonable zoning concern, in the same manner utilized in restricting
manufacturing establishments in residential zones. 103 What a board of supervisors
cannot do is effectuate a ban of a business on strictly moral or personal grounds. 104
In practice, what this means is that through zoning, a municipality cannot
ban outright an industry because the zoning commission finds the industry
offensive, or because members of the board have a financial stake in disallowing
it. 105 Yet, a business can be banned from an entire jurisdiction if there are
legitimate grounds that satisfy the requirements discussed earlier; namely, that the
ordinance is reasonable and not arbitrary, furthering the health and welfare of the
community at large. 106 Consider two cases. In the first, Desert Turf Club, the
board of supervisors in Riverside County passed an ordinance banning from the
county all horse racing tracks, even though through referendum the people had
given the power of regulating horse racing to the state legislature. 107 In the other,
Wal-Mart Stores, the board of supervisors for the City of Turlock banned all “bigbox retailers” from the jurisdiction, even though under state law, “big-box
retailers” were legal. 108 The two courts came to two very different conclusions
regarding whether or not the local ordinances overstepped their bounds. In Desert
Turf Club, the court found the ordinance violated the preemption doctrine, 109 while
in Wal-Mart Stores the court found that state law did not preempt the ordinance. 110
In the first case, the court determined that the people, through referendum
and in conjunction with the state legislature, had clearly intended to “fully occupy”
the legal field of horse racing. 111 As a result, the ordinance was preempted. 112
Conversely, in Wal-Mart Stores, the court found that there was no sign, implicit or
expressed, that the ordinance overstepped its bounds. 113
IV. LEGAL BACKGROUND OF MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES
“That is not a drug. It’s a leaf.”
-Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger
California became the first state to legalize the use of marijuana for

103

See Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 440–41.
See Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 886.
105
Id.
106
Supra notes 22–30.
107
Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 883–84.
108
Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 421–22.
109
Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 888 (“As it appears to us that the Board of Supervisors based its
actions on an erroneous conclusion as to its legal rights and duties, and that upon the record legitimately
before it the Board acted in abuse of its discretion, a writ of mandate should issue.”).
110
Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 438.
111
Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 450–51.
112
Id.
113
Wal-Mart Stores, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 438–39.
104

228

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:II

medicinal purposes in 1996. 114 This was accomplished through Proposition 215,
also known as the Compassionate Use Act (CUA), which won a majority of the
public vote, 115 and paved the way for thirteen other states to enact similar laws. 116
The CUA was codified as Health and Safety Code section 11362.5 and was created
to, among other things, “ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to
obtain and use marijuana for medicinal purposes,” and “to ensure that patients and
their primary caregivers who obtain and use marijuana . . . are not subject to
criminal prosecution or sanction.” 117
Early critics of the proposition claimed that the language contained within
the four corners of the law was too vague. 118 The subsequent data may now prove
that prediction accurate, as there are an estimated 200,000 Californians who have
received a prescription for marijuana. 119 But the largest problems did not come
from some sudden influx of marijuana; instead, the largest hurdles created by
Proposition 215 came from its implementation. 120 There were no clear guidelines
explaining how patients could receive the drug, nor was there guidance to law
enforcement regarding how to tell the difference between a legitimate user and
someone using the drug illegally. 121 This vagueness resulted in multiple cases
arriving at the appellate level, as citizens and law enforcement grappled with what
to make of the new legal landscape. 122
Realizing these issues, the California legislature introduced and enacted
Senate Bill 420 in an effort to solve the many problems created by Proposition 215
(later codified in the California Health and Safety Code). 123 The bill, titled the
114
Patrick Stack, A Brief History of Medical Marijuana, TIME MAGAZINE (Oct. 21, 2009),
http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,1931247,00.html.
115
Bill Jones, Cal. Sec’y of State, Supplement Statement of Vote 102 (Nov. 5, 1996), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/1996-general/1996-general-ssov.pdf. The CUA was passed with
approximately 55% of the vote. Id.
116
Patricia Salkin, Medical Marijuana Meets Zoning: Can You Grow, Sell, and Smoke That Here?,
62 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. No. 8, 3 (2010). These states are: Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine,
Michigan, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont and
Washington. Id.
117
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996).
118
Scott Imler & Stephen Gutwillig, Medical Marijuana in California: A History, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 6, 2009), http://www.latimes.com/features/health/la-oew-gutwillig-imler6-2009mar06,0,2951626.
story. In fact, Senator Diane Feinstein reportedly said that Proposition 215 was so poorly written,
“you’ll be able to drive a truckload of marijuana through the holes in it.” Id.
119
Id.
120
Tammy McCabe, It’s High Time: California Attempts to Clear the Smoke Surrounding The
Compassionate Use Act, 35 MCGEORGE L. REV. 545, 549 (2004) (there was no guidance within the
new law providing for the structure of dispensaries or co-ops).
121
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). See also McCabe, supra note 120, at
549.
122
See People v. Urziceanu, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 859, 873 (Ct. App. 2005) (explaining, “the
Compassionate Use Act is a narrowly drafted statement designed to allow a qualified patient and his or
her primary caregiver to possess and cultivate marijuana for the patient’s personal use despite penal
laws that outlaw these two acts for all others”); People v. Mower, 49 P.3d 1067 (2002) (holding that the
medical-marijuana defense offers only limited immunity, rather than complete immunity from criminal
prosecution); People v. Rigo, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 624 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating, “the acts of selling, giving
away, transporting, and growing large quantities of marijuana remain criminal”).
123
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004). The Statutory Notes state that
following the implementation of the CUA, “reports from across the state have revealed problems and
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Medical Marijuana Protection Act (MMPA), had the expressed intention of solving
the problems created by the CUA, 124 and in some respects succeeded. 125 First, the
bill defined key terms, which had become controversial following the passage of
the CUA. 126 This included defining what constituted an illness justifying the
prescription of marijuana, and who could be considered a patient. 127 Next, the
MMPA tackled criminal liability by limiting the criminal liability of a qualified
patient. 128
Most importantly, however, the MMPA laid the foundation for storefront
dispensaries. 129 Although initially vague, section 11362.81, subdivision (d), of the
MMPA provides that, “the Attorney General shall develop and adopt appropriate
guidelines to ensure the security and nondiversion of marijuana grown for medical
use by patients qualified under the Compassionate Use Act.” 130 This instruction
led to the “Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of Marijuana Grown for
Medical Use,” released on August 25, 2008 (herein Guidelines). 131 The
Guidelines are not legally binding, but the document does hold considerable legal
weight. 132
The Guidelines explain that the only legally permissible business models
entitled to engage in the distribution of marijuana are cooperatives and
collectives. 133 All cooperatives must be properly organized and registered as a
corporation under the Corporations or Food and Agricultural Codes, and file
articles of incorporation with the state. 134 The attorney general later defines a
cooperative corporation as “democratically controlled and are not organized to
make a profit for themselves, as such, or for their members, as such, but primarily
for their members as patrons.” 135 Although California law does not recognize
collectives as an independent business entity, the Guidelines explain, “a collective
should be an organization that merely facilitates the collaborative efforts of patient

uncertainties in the Act that have impeded the ability of law enforcement officers to enforce its
provisions as the voters intended.” Id.
124
Id.
125
Scott Imler, supra note 118 (“I would consider SB420 a qualified success”).
126
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7(h) (West 2004).
127
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 11362.7(a), (h) (West 2004).
128
Id. (specifically, individuals “shall not be subject, on that sole basis” to liability under Health
and Safety Code section 11357 (possession), section 11358 (cultivation), section 11359 (possession for
sale), section 11360 (transportation, sale, distribution), section 11366 (opening or maintaining an
unlawful place), section 11366.5 (providing a place for unlawful acts involving controlled substances),
and section 11570 (nuisance)). See McCabe, supra note 120 n.43.
129
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.81(d) (West 2004).
130
Id.
131
Edmund G. Brown, Cal. State Att’y General, Guidelines for the Security and Non-Diversion of
Marijuana Grown for Medical Use, (Aug. 2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/press/
pdfs/n1601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines.pdf.
132
Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 98 (Ct. App. 2010) (quoting
Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v. Employees Retirement System, 863 P.2d 218, 223 (Cal. 1993)).
133
Brown, supra note 131.
134
Id.
135
Id. (quoting CAL. CORP. CODE § 12201 (West 2011)).
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and caregiver members – including the allocation of costs and revenues.” 136
Following the publication of the attorney general’s guidelines, it became
clear that, under state law, marijuana dispensaries would be permissible so long as
they operated on a not-for-profit basis and that the dispensaries operated on a
closed loop system. 137 In other words, the marijuana had to come from the
members of the group, and could only be sold to the members of the group. 138
Outsiders would not be allowed into the closed system, unless eligible under the
MMPA. 139
It matters not, then, if the cooperative corporation or the collective has a
storefront. 140 In fact, to clarify the issue further, the attorney general points out
that while, “dispensaries, as such, are not recognized under the law . . . a properly
organized and operated collective or cooperative that dispenses medical marijuana
through a storefront may be lawful . . . .” 141 This is an important revelation for the
owners of the approximately 966 store front dispensaries scattered throughout Los
Angeles. 142
V. WHEN ZONING AUTHORITY CLASHES WITH STATE & FEDERAL LAW
“There seems to be no public policy purpose for [that] zoning. This whole thing
just smacks of special interest politics.”
-Ken Thompson, Co-Creator of Google’s Programming Language
Whenever a new and perhaps contentious land use request is filed with a
local zoning authority, it is common for planning commissions to enact a
moratorium in an effort to buy some time in order to determine how to handle the
permitting. 143 Because these moratoria are temporary solutions, it is only a matter
of time before a final zoning decision is handed down. 144 Although the power of
local municipalities to regulate land usage within their jurisdiction seems to be
expansive, it does have its limits. Those limits have scarcely ever been tested as
consistently (and with as much aggression) as they have in the face of the

136
Id. The attorney general further relies on the dictionary to define a collective, stating, “the
dictionary defines them as ‘a business, farm, etc. jointly owned and operated by the members of a
group.’” Id.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
See generally id.
141
Id. The attorney general provides an example of a dispensary acting unlawfully: “dispensaries
that merely require patients to complete a form summarily designating the business owner as their
primary caregiver – and then offering marijuana in exchange for cash ‘donations’ – are likely
unlawful.” Id.
142
Doug Smith & Thomas Suh Lauder, Where’s the Weed? Mapping LA’s Marijuana
Dispensaries, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 10, 2009), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2009/09/medicalmarijuana-in-los-angeles.html.
143
See City of Corona v. Naulls, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 (Ct. App. 2008).
144
CAL. GOV’T CODE § 65858 (West 2002).
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explosion of storefront dispensaries. 145 This section will examine the ways
business owners have attempted to circumvent local planning commissions in an
effort to start a business, and how, on occasion, they have succeeded.
A. Preemption by State Statute
The driving force behind preemption is the concept of state sovereignty, but
as discussed supra in Part II, the implied power of preemption is not without its
limits. 146 The court has set up factors to consider in determining whether or not an
ordinance is preempted, 147 and has applied them in multiple recent decisions
regarding a myriad of regulations discussed below.
In Big Creek Lumber, the County of Santa Cruz passed zoning ordinances
restricting permissible locations of timber operations to specified zones within the
county. 148 A lumber company subsequently challenged the ordinances, claiming
the ordinances were preempted by the Z’berg-Nejedly Forest Practice Act of 1973
(a state law). 149 The court determined that, within the Act, the state legislature had
expressed its intention to preempt local regulations regarding the conduct of timber
harvesting, but not the location. 150 Further, the court said, “by expressly
preempting local regulations targeting the conduct of timber operations . . . [the
Forest Practice Act] implicitly permits local regulations addressed to other aspects
of timber operations.” 151 Essentially, the court found that the Forest Practice Act
only regulated the “how” and not the “where,” and in doing so, implied that local
municipalities had the authority to regulate the “where.” 152
Conversely, in California Grocers, the court determined that state Health and
Safety Codes preempted a Los Angeles ordinance. 153 The ordinance in question
required purchasers of large grocery stores to employ the pre-existing staff for at
least 90 days following the acquisition. 154 The court found, however, that the
ordinance was being used to maintain health and safety standards, which was
expressly preempted by the California Retail Food Code (CRFC). 155 When

145
“Explosion” is used to describe the rapid increase of dispensaries in Los Angeles over the past
four years—leveling off at approximately 1,000 dispensaries (outnumbering Starbucks in some
neighborhoods). Madalite Del Barco, In California, Marijuana Dispensaries Outnumber Starbucks,
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=
113822156.
146
See supra notes 21–30.
147
See supra notes 56–92.
148
Big Creek Lumber Co. v. County of Santa Cruz, 136 P.3d 821, 824 (Cal. 2006); see also CAL.
PUB. RES. CODE § 4511 (West 2011).
149
Big Creek Lumber, 136 P.3d at 824.
150
Id. at 828–31.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Cal. Grocers Ass’n. v. City of L.A., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34, 37–38 (Ct. App. 2009), rev’d 254 P.3d
1019 (Cal. 2011).
154
Id.
155
Id. In order to make this determination, the court examined the legislative history of the
ordinance, the comments made by legislators during debate, as well as the language of the ordinance
itself. Id.
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enacting the CRFC, the legislature expressly declared that, “it is the intent of the
Legislature to occupy the whole field of health and sanitation standards for retail
food facilities.” 156 Given this expressed preemptive intent, the court determined
that the Los Angeles ordinance was preempted by state law. 157
In both of these situations, the courts have turned to the content of the statute
and the intentions of the legislature. 158 When there is not direct language
indicating preemptive intent, as there was in California Grocers, the courts must
rely on what the legislators intended when enacting the law. 159 The MMPA does
not speak to the topic of preemption. 160 Nevertheless the fact that the stated
purpose of the Act was to “promote uniform and consistent application of the act
among the counties within the state,” must be taken into consideration by the
courts when deciding what the legislature intended. 161 Here, the legislature clearly
intended to create a uniform, statewide, set of guidelines for the implementation of
the CUA.
B. Preemption by Referendum
The California Constitution provides for the creation of initiative statutes or
referendums through popular vote. 162 This process requires that proponents of a
proposed ordinance submit an initiative petition signed by the requisite number of
voters, at which time the proposed ordinance can be placed to a public vote. 163
The initiative process can be utilized for those seeking to change state, county, or
city laws. 164 Because it is one of the few examples of the people voting directly
for a law—instead of electing representatives who vote for laws on the people’s
behalf—it is perhaps one of the only vestiges of a direct democracy in the federal
system.
In determining whether a state law preempts a local ordinance, courts have
paid an increased amount of deference towards those laws, which have been
enacted directly by the people. 165 In Desert Turf Club, discussed supra, the court

156

Id. at 38.
Id. at 45.
158
Id. at 38, 44–45.
159
Supra notes 73–79.
160
See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004).
161
Id. The legislative notes states in relevant part:
It is the intent of the Legislature, therefore, to do all of the following: (1) Clarify
the scope of the application of the act and facilitate the prompt identification of
qualified patients and their designated primary caregivers in order to avoid
unnecessary arrest and prosecution of these individuals and provide needed
guidance to law enforcement officers. (2) Promote uniform and consistent
application of the act among the counties within the state.
Id. (emphasis added).
162
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1. “The legislative power of this State is vested in the California
Legislature which consists of the Senate and Assembly, but the people reserve to themselves the powers
of initiative and referendum.” Id.
163
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 9101 (West 2003).
164
CAL. CONST. art. II, § 2.
165
See Desert Turf Club v. Board of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882, 884 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
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recognized the added legal weight of a law passed by popular vote and questioned
whether, “a board of supervisors [can] overrule the act of the people of the state in
adopting a constitutional amendment and the legislature of the state in passing a
full and comprehensive plan for the licensing and control by forbidding on moral
grounds what the state expressly permits?” 166 The court found the answer to quite
simply be “no.” 167
The similarities between marijuana dispensaries and horse racing tracks are
fairly numerous. First, medicinal marijuana was decriminalized in 1996 by
initiative, 168 just as horse racing was legalized in 1933 by amendment. 169 Second,
in both cases following legalization, the legislature instituted a more
comprehensive plan to carry out the will of the people. 170 Third, following
implementation of both the initiative and the subsequent legislative plan,
individual counties and cities attempted to ban outright, through zoning, both
marijuana dispensaries and horse racing. 171
In Desert Turf Club, the court managed to walk a thin line. The court
determined that a local municipality could ban horseracing tracks—even after a
statewide initiative passed, permitting them—but could only do so while acting in
good faith, and not arbitrarily or unreasonably. 172 In other words, the zoning board
must simply work within the confines of the authority granted to it, and thus avoid
banning something based only on personal beliefs or moral opposition. 173 Yet, if a
zoning board found legitimate zoning concerns, it would be justified in banning a
certain business or activity even after a public referendum condoned that very
activity or business. 174
For marijuana dispensaries this is an ominous realization. Although the
courts have made it clear that every business is safe from zoning boards that
function with an ulterior, moral agenda that does not mean that such zoning boards
are powerless. 175 Based solely on the reasonableness standard, a city planning
commission need only provide a plausible reason for banning a business. 176 Given
the current nature of the medical marijuana industry, the “reasonableness” standard
is not a particularly difficult standard to meet. 177
166

Id. at 885.
Id. (“There is no escape, in our opinion, from a negative answer.”).
168
Stack, supra note 114.
169
CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25.5 (repealed 1966).
170
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.7 (West 2004) created the MMPA, while CAL. BUS. &
PROF. CODE §§ 19400–19663 (West 2008) created what was known as the “Horse Racing Law.”
171
Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 882–85 (banning horseracing tracks in Riverside County); see
Memorandum from Richard Doyle, City Attorney, and Robert L. Davies, Chief of Police to Honorable
Mayor and City Council Members (Mar. 16, 2010), available at http://tiny.cc/joek1 (stating,
“[c]ommercial dispensaries that sell marijuana to qualified medical patients or their primary caregivers
for medicinal purposes would not comport with either state or federal laws and, so, would constitute a
public nuisance and not be allowed anywhere in the City”).
172
Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d at 885–86.
173
See generally id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
See Wal-Mart Stores Inc. v. City of Turlock, 41 Cal. Rptr. 3d 420, 438–39 (Ct. App. 2006).
177
Consider the Los Angeles Department of City Planning’s Recommendation Report concerning
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C. Preemption by Federal Law
Multiple attempts have been made by opponents of medical marijuana
dispensaries to argue that the city must act in compliance with federal law—as
opposed to state law—because federal law preempts state law. 178 This argument
was actually not addressed until very recently in Qualified Patients Association,
when the court answered the question directly. 179 It serves an important purpose,
however, to first understand the nature of the claim.
City councils have claimed that because the federal Controlled Substance
Act criminalized marijuana, it is a violation of federal law for a local government
to authorize the existence of medical marijuana dispensaries. 180 Fearing
prosecution, cities have opted to side with the federal government as opposed to
complying with state law. 181 This logic was dismissed first in City of Garden
Grove, and then later in Qualified Patients Association. 182 In this area the
appellate courts have made two significant findings. First, the courts found that
federal law did not preempt California’s marijuana laws. 183 The court determined
that “no conflict arises based on the fact that Congress has chosen to prohibit the
possession of medical marijuana while California has chosen not to.” 184 This
means that the MMPA does not require anything that the Controlled Substances
Act forbids. 185 The court went further, pointing out that the federal Controlled
Substances Act does not direct local governments regarding zoning power in any
way, and consequently, a local government’s compliance with state law does not
violate federal law. 186 What this means is the fact that an individual or collective
corporation chooses to act in a way that violates federal but not state law, does not
alone relay liability unto the municipality. 187 As a result, federal law does not

a moratorium on dispensaries. L.A. DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, RECOMMENDATION REPORT, CPC
2007-0280-ICO, at 1 (Mar. 22, 2007), available at http://cityplanning.lacity.org/Code_Studies/Misc/
Marijuanna.pdf. The report recommended the implementation of a moratorium in order to study the
effects of dispensaries on the city. Id. The recommendation was based, in part, upon a police report,
which stated, “the proliferation of medical marijuana dispensaries has led to increased crime and
violence.” Id at 6. The police report, however, is not the final say on the relationship between
dispensaries and crime. A recent study by the Rand Corporation showed that the existence of a medical
marijuana dispensary did not increase crime, and in some cases even reduced crime. John Hoeffel,
Study On Pot Shops Has A Twist, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2011), http://www.latimes.com/news/local/lame-0928-marijuana-dispensaries-20110921,0,7776989.story.
178
See generally Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 105 (2010);
Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, 9 (Ct. App. 2009); Garden Grove v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 656, 673–74 (Ct. App. 2007).
179
Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105.
180
Supra note 178.
181
Id.
182
See Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105–10; Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
673–78.
183
Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105–10.
184
Id. at 107 (quoting Garden Grove, 68 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 677).
185
Id.
186
Id. “Governmental entities do not incur aider and abettor or direct liability by complying with
their obligations under the state marijuana laws.” Id.
187
Id.
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preempt California’s medical marijuana laws. 188
D. Criminalization
In some situations, local municipalities have gone so far as to criminalize
certain businesses or groups, even while under state law the business or activity is
valid. 189 In Qualified Patients Association, the City of Anaheim enacted an
ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to own, operate, or be employed by a
medical marijuana dispensary. 190 The ordinance was contrary to the MMPA,
enacted by the state legislature as Senate Bill No. 420, and the CUA, which had
decriminalized medicinal marijuana, cooperative corporations, and collectives. 191
Anaheim argued that California’s dispensary laws were preempted by the federal
Controlled Substances Act, and therefore, was inapplicable to local
Qualified Patients Association, a medicinal marijuana
municipalities. 192
dispensary operating within Anaheim, sought a declaratory judgment that the
state’s marijuana laws preempted Anaheim’s ordinance. 193 The trial court granted
Anaheim’s demurrer, but an appellate court reversed the demurrer and remanded
the case back to the trial courts, putting off the discussion of state preemption until
adequately adjudicated. 194
Because of this ruling there remains the question of state preemption—
specifically, can Anaheim criminalize dispensaries without regard for state law?
The appellate court had hinted at the answer before overturning the lower court’s
demurrer and remanding for further proceedings. The appellate court said, “it
seems odd the [state] Legislature would disagree with federal policymakers . . . but
intend that local legislatures could side with their federal—instead of state—
counterparts in prohibiting and criminalizing . . . medical marijuana activities.
After all, local entities are creatures of the state, not the federal government.” 195
Picking up on this “hint,” Judge Caffee of the Superior Court of Orange
County ruled that state law preempted the portion of Anaheim’s ordinance that
criminalized medical marijuana dispensaries. 196 The Superior Court found that the
goal of the CUA to protect qualified patients from criminal liability was in direct
conflict of Anaheim’s ordinance. 197 However, the Superior Court also found that
188

Id. at 105–10.
See id. at 92 (criminalizing storefront dispensaries); see also Lancaster v. Municipal Court, 494
P.2d 681 passim (Cal. 1972) (finding that an ordinance making it a misdemeanor for physical
therapists, masseuses, etc. to massage members of the opposite sex improperly expanded upon state law
and was therefore preempted).
190
Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 93 (quoting ANAHEIM, CAL., ORDINANCE ch.
4.20, § 4.20.030 (2007)).
191
See supra notes 114–39.
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Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105.
193
Id. at 92.
194
Id. At the time of this writing, the case is currently pending before a trial court.
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Id.
196
Minute Order at 1, Qualified Patients Ass’n v. Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 89, No.
07CC09524 (Aug. 15, 2011), available at http://americansforsafeaccess.org/downloads/Anaheim_
Superior_Court_Trial_Ruling.pdf [hereinafter Minute Order]
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Id.
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the CUA and MMPA do not fully occupy the field of law surrounding marijuana
dispensaries, and that the state legislature intended to allow local governments to
address the issue more fully. 198 The ability to regulate dispensaries into oblivion is
within the powers of local governments. 199 As a result, Judge Caffee severed the
criminal portion of the ordinance, but ruled that the remaining portions were
valid. 200 What this means in a real world context is that dispensaries are still not
allowed in Anaheim, but opening one or working in one is not grounds for criminal
liability—the city will simply shut it down, or not issue a business permit to begin
with.
VI. IMPACT
“The Chief Business of the American People is Business”
-President Calvin Coolidge
The current legal issues facing medicinal marijuana dispensaries may seem
like a distant plight to most businesses, but that understanding of the issue could be
dangerously short-sighted. Instead, the power of local governments to ban outright
entire business models that are otherwise legal should be a very real concern. The
Home Rule was designed to decentralize power away from Sacramento and into
the hands of local legislatures, 201 but courts have failed to delineate clearly where
one authority ends and the other begins. As a result, zoning commissions often
find themselves in legal battles to determine whether or not they have overstepped
their authority.
A. Impact on Dispensaries
At the most basic level, criminalization by local governments of an expressly
sanctioned business goes too far. It seems clear that the appellate court and the
superior court’s observation in Qualified Patients Association was keen: it is
categorically illogical for the state legislature to expressly decriminalize a
business, with the intention that local governments be allowed to disregard the
law. 202 Local governments are nothing but an extension of the state legislature;
they were created at Sacramento’s whim and therefore dictated by the laws of the
land. 203
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Id.
Id. This view was recently echoed by Governor Jerry Brown who vetoed a statewide bill that
would have banned marijuana dispensaries from being established within 600 feet of a school. In
explaining his choice to veto, Governor Brown stated, “[d]ecisions of this kind are best made in cities
and counties, not the state capitol.” Patrick McGreevy, Brown Vetos Pot Shop Bill, L.A. TIMES (Sept.
22, 2011), available at http://www.latimes.com/la-me-brown-marijuana-20110922,0,1067869.story.
200
See Minute Order, supra note 196.
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See supra notes 67–72.
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Qualified Patients Ass’n v. City of Anaheim, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d 89, 103 (2010).
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See supra note 1. See Webb v. Cal. Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 92 (Cal. 1913) (quoting Payne v.
Treadwell, 16 Cal. 220, 233 (1860)) (“A municipal corporation is a public institution, created for public
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Criminalization moves beyond an act of mere zoning. It is clear that a local
municipality is authorized to zone in a manner dictated by statute and common
law—namely in a way that is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary; 204 however the
act of criminalizing dispensaries steps far beyond these confines. In Qualified
Patients Association, the City of Anaheim argued that they were complying with
federal law by criminalizing medical marijuana dispensaries. 205 This, however, is
not an accurate depiction of the function of local government. Local government
is designed to carry out the will of the state legislature. 206 It could be argued that
local governments are also designed to give a voice to the individual communities
who may wish to fashion their community as they see fit. Proponents of this view
point would likely argue that it should therefore be left up to the local governing
agencies to determine the layout and content of the community. This argument,
however, ignores the realities of our federalist system. Decentralized power within
the state—as within the country—is not the equivalent of a freestanding
government. As each locality is the creation of the state, each is therefore
beholden to the state so as to create a uniform set of rules and regulations. 207
Local criminalization of marijuana dispensaries in defiance of a state law that
expressly legalized the same is therefore overreaching and unjustified. The court
in Qualified Patients Association ruled accordingly.
Most localities, however, have relied not on criminalization, but on
moratoria and zoning. When enacted correctly, zoning regulations and moratoria
affecting dispensaries have been upheld in multiple instances throughout the
state. 208 Distance restrictions, moratoria, and express limits on the number of
dispensaries are all legitimate uses of a local government’s police powers. 209 The
process goes awry, however, if local officials attempt to ban the businesses
outright based solely upon personal feelings harbored towards dispensaries. 210 In
these situations, courts must not be timid in the protection of these dispensaries by

purposes; the municipality is a political subdivision or department of the state, governed, and regulated,
and constituted by public law . . . the original power to control, as well as to create them, therefore, is in
the Legislature.”).
204
See supra note 29.
205
Qualified Patients Ass’n, 115 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 105.
206
See supra note 1.
207
Id.
208
See Claremont v. Kruse, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1 passim (Ct. App. 2009) (upholding moratorium
and ordinance); City of Corona v. Naulls, 83 Cal. Rptr. 3d 1, passim (Ct. App. 2008) (upholding
moratorium and ordinance). In contrast, consider the current status of Los Angeles’ moratorium on
dispensaries — which has endured years of legal battles and has on multiple occasions been struck
down due to the failure of the city council to follow state law in renewing the moratorium. See John
Hoeffel, 229 medical marijuana dispensaries make deadline for L.A.’s lottery to see which can stay
open legally, L.A. TIMES NOW BLOG (Feb. 24, 2011), http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2011/02/
medical-marijuana-los-angeles-lottery.html. Today, the city has instituted a lottery in order to randomly
choose those dispensaries, which may continue to operate within city borders. Id.
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See J.M. Brown, County Panel OK’s Medical Marijuana Rules, SANTA CRUZ SENTINEL (Feb.
10, 2011), http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/ci_17346990; John Hoeffel, Los Angeles City Council
Passes Medical Marijuana Dispensary Ordinance, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 19, 2010), http://articles.latimes.
com/2010/jan/19/local/la-me-medical-marijuana20-2010jan20.
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Desert Turf Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882, 885 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956).
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applying the precedent set forth in Desert Turf Club, 211 as zoning commissions are
simply not entitled to act arbitrarily.
Nevertheless, through preemption, dispensaries may be able to escape the
powerful zoning commissions. Although the Home Rule places authority in the
hands of zoning boards to handle municipal affairs, this power does not give local
municipalities the ability to regulate anything that occurs within their jurisdiction
without regard for what occurs outside of it. Instead, the courts evolving
understanding of the Home Rule reveals a weaker delineation of power than
originally defined. 212 In Polis v. City of La Palma, the court ruled that state
preemption of a local ordinance is likely to exist where there was not “a significant
local interest to be served that may differ from one locality to another.” 213 In other
words, if the ordinance in question regards an issue occupied by state law, and that
issue is essentially static from one municipality to the next, then the state law
regarding that issue would sufficiently occupy that field of law, leaving no room
for further regulation at the municipal level.
If this proposition is correct, then the threat stemming from the subject of the
ordinance is no more severe from one municipality to the next, and the city cannot
justify an expansion or restriction of the state law. 214 Assume arguendo that
dispensaries operating within the confines of the law are no less and no more
dangerous in Anaheim than they are in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Humboldt
County, or Fresno. It follows then, that there is no justification for the limitation of
the applicability of state law from city to city. Under this understanding,
dispensaries sanctioned by state law should not be subjected to unnecessarily
restrictive local ordinances that differ from locality to locality.
Further, when looking to determine whether the MMPA or the CUA
expressly or implicitly preempts a local ordinance, the courts should consider the
legislative notes following the text of the MMPA itself. Although there is no
expressed preemptive intent within the MMPA, the legislative notes clearly state
that the goal of the legislature was to create a uniform set of guidelines. 215 This is
a straightforward, unambiguous expression of preemptive intent. The legislature
has made it clear that the rules and guidelines set forth in the MMPA are designed
for statewide application. The goal was to avoid the very patchwork of regulation
that local ordinances have since created.
Alternatively, note that nothing within the CUA or the MMPA compels cities
and counties to accommodate dispensaries. 216 If the courts chose not to adhere to
the legislative notes, the strongest argument available to dispensary owners hoping
to overturn an unduly burdensome zoning restriction still lies within the court’s
existing preemption test. In determining preemption, courts consider the three
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See supra notes 165–74; Desert Turf Club, 296 P.2d passim.
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distinct indicia of implied preemption discussed above. 217 The third indicium
states, “the subject matter has been partially covered by general law, and the
subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a local ordinance on the
transient citizens of the state outweighs the possible benefits to the locality.” 218
This is a dispensary owner’s most cogent argument. Because cooperative
corporations and collectives exist for the sole purpose of providing a state
recognized medication to legitimate patients, an ordinance which forbids the sale
of this medication would invariably affect transient patients.
Taking the court’s third indicium in pieces, it is clear that the subject matter
has been partially covered by state law: the MMPA and the CUA both pertain to
medical marijuana, and the MMPA deals directly with patients and their
caregivers. 219 The second clause requires that harm to transient citizens caused by
the ordinance outweigh the benefits to the locality. 220 The harm to legitimate
patients who use marijuana to treat their symptoms appears to be severe. 221 In real
terms, this is tantamount to a municipality banning pain medication to injured
athletes, and appetite inducing medication for chemotherapy patients. The ability
of a sick patient to receive medication should not be subject to the whims of the
zoning commission. Patients should not be restricted in their travels to those
places that allow for their medication. 222
B. Impact on Other Businesses
Recently, the Los Angeles City Council banned new fast food restaurants
from opening in South Los Angeles—a move that angered many residents. 223 The
ban came following the expiration of a moratorium enacted in 2008. 224 The ability
of the city council to ban new fast food restaurants from opening is rooted firmly
in the same power that allows the city council to ban medical marijuana
dispensaries. 225 The city council has acted well within its authority in doing so;
they have argued that the ban is directly related to the health and welfare of the
city. 226 Given the deference that the courts pay to the local legislatures, this claim
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.” Commissioner Mark Stone of the California Coastal Commission, referring to Laguna Beach’s
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223
Medina, supra note 2.
224
Id.
225
See e.g., Medina,supra note 2..
226
Id. This is further bolstered by the realization that since the moratorium, although not a single
218

240

BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP & THE LAW

Vol. V:II

is unlikely to be disputed. 227
This is the type of action that business owners must be wary of, and it is
what marijuana dispensaries have in common with owners of fast-food restaurants,
bankers, and retailers: all are subject to the zoning commissions’ decisions to
allow, or not to allow, a business. In Wal-Mart, a city ordinance banning “bigbox” retailers was upheld as a valid use of a local government’s police power. 228
The court determined that the increase in pollution, coupled with the fear of “urban
decay,” was sufficient reason for the city council to pass the ordinance. 229 The
court also found that the unintended consequence of limiting economic
competition was of no concern. 230
It seems then, virtually impossible for a business to overcome a zoning
ordinance that places restrictions upon it in excess of state law. The complaining
business must show one of two things: either state law preempts the ordinance, or
the ordinance is unreasonable or arbitrary. 231 The latter, as discussed, is very
difficult to prove—so preemption is often the only argument to make. 232
VII. CONCLUSION
The Home Rule has many valuable qualities—the most important of which
may be the ability of communities to handle municipal affairs without interference
from Sacramento. Local governments are more amenable to the needs of their
constituents, and are capable of tailoring rules and regulations to fit the needs of
the community better than the state legislature, which must legislate for a larger,
more diverse group.
Nevertheless, when state law expressly authorizes the existence of a
business, product, or group, it seems extremely illogical that local municipalities
should be allowed to reject the law and ban what the state has expressly
authorized. This argument is founded in the understanding that local governments
are not autonomous islands. As the court stated in Abbott v. City of Los Angeles,
“[t]he denial of power to a local body when the state has preempted the field is not
based solely upon the superior authority of the state. It is a rule of necessity, based
upon the need to prevent dual regulations which could result in uncertainty or

fast food restaurant has opened, the first grocery store in approximately ten years opened in the area.
Id.
227
“[S]o long as [there is] a ‘question upon which reasonable minds may differ,’ there will be no
judicial interference with [a] municipality’s determination of policy.” Clemons v. City of L.A., 222
P.2d 439, 448 (Cal. 1950).
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notes 108–13.
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Id. at 439.
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Id. at 439–441.
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See generally Cal. Grocers Ass’n v. City of L.A., 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 34 passim (Ct. App. 2009)
(finding that by including the phrase “it is the intent of the Legislature to occupy the whole field of
health and sanitation standards for retail food facilities” the legislature created an expressed intent to
fully occupy the field); Desert Turf Club v. Bd. of Supervisors, 296 P.2d 882 passim (Cal. Ct. App.
1956) (finding an ordinance banning horse racing in San Bernardino County to be arbitrary).
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confusion.” 233 Further, local municipalities are an extension of the state
government and should function as such.
Zoning authority is one of many police powers granted to local
municipalities through the Home Rule. This power serves an important function in
the planning and execution of a city, and when used properly, zoning ordinances
truly do promote public health, safety, and the general welfare. But, as Article XI,
section 7 of the California State Constitution explains, municipal ordinances and
regulations may not conflict with the general laws. 234 It is from this rule that the
doctrine of state preemption is drawn.
Understanding the principles of preemption and the rules governing zoning
authority, business owners can be armed with the information necessary to try and
protect themselves from ordinances that may limit a businesses’ growth or its very
existence. Nowhere is this more prevalent than in the current debate over medical
marijuana dispensaries. As Qualified Patients Association makes its way through
the appellate process, the unjustifiable claims posed by the City of Anaheim should
be disregarded, and the ordinance criminalizing what the state has expressly
sanctioned should be struck down as preempted. As local governments attempt to
grapple with the sudden influx of cooperative corporations and collectives, the
courts must continue to uphold the principles of preemption, and be wary of
unreasonable and arbitrary zoning regulations.
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